The (In)Visibility of Undisclosed Political Connections

Abstract

Despite a strong investor and social demand for firms to disclose information on political connections, mandatory disclosure requirements face considerable opposition. Given the challenges in enforcing mandatory disclosures, we investigate whether private information acquisition can be a viable alternative to disclosure. Using a setting of corruption investigations, we find that investors, on average, are not aware that the firms they have invested in have connections with the officials under investigation, suggesting a lack of visibility of the connections. However, a small number of institutional investors exploit their private access to information and sell their shares in response to the investigations. We also show that the high costs of information acquisition and a lack of incentives for analysts to disseminate sensitive information they have obtained contribute to this lack of visibility and result in a significant delay in retail investors’ reaction to material information. Our study contributes to the debate on mandating disclosure of political connections by showing that the lack of mandatory disclosure results in an uneven playing field that undermines transparency and fairness.